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Abstract
In recent years, quantitative security techniques have been providing effective measures of the
security of a system against an attacker. Such techniques usually assume that the system produces
a finite amount of observations based on a finite amount of secret bits and terminates, and the
attack is based on these observations. By modeling systems with Markov chains, we are able to
measure the effectiveness of attacks on non-terminating systems. Such systems do not necessarily
produce a finite amount of output and are not necessarily based on a finite amount of secret bits.
We provide characterizations and algorithms to define meaningful measures of security for non-
terminating systems, and to compute them when possible. We also study the bounded versions
of the problems, and show examples of non-terminating programs and how their effectiveness in
protecting their secret can be measured.
1998 ACM Subject Classification D.4.6 Security and Protection, G.3 Stochastic Processes, H.1.1
Systems and Information Theory
Keywords and phrases Quantitative information flow, Markov chain, information leakage, infin-
ite execution
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2014.517
1 Introduction
Information-theoretical quantitative security techniques evaluate the effectiveness of a system
in protecting a secret it depends on. Given a known finite size of a secret in bits, they
quantify how many bits of the secret can be inferred by an attacker able to observe the
system’s output. This value is referred to as information leakage, or just leakage. Leakage
quantification techniques have been successfully applied to security problems, including
proving the effectiveness of bug fixes to the Linux kernel [10], quantifying anonymity [6], and
analyzing side channel attacks to the cache of a processor [11].
The theory behind these techniques commonly assumes that the program under analysis
terminates at some point, and the computed leakage corresponds to the amount of information
that the attacker gains at program termination time. When the secret does not change
during computation, a program can be modeled as a channel matrix, assigning the conditional
probability of each possible output for each possible input. The size of the channel matrix is
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Figure 1 Leakage of various process topologies.
usually exponential in both secret and output size. We have previously proposed the use of
Markovian models instead to overcome this problem [4].
Markovian models can also be conveniently used to model non-terminating processes,
something finite-size channel matrices cannot do. This allows us to study leakage properties
of systems like webservices, server modules and operating system daemons.
In this paper we provide techniques and algorithms to quantify the Shannon leakage
and leakage rate of non-terminating processes. Shannon leakage has a clear operational
significance related to the number of attempts that an attacker has to try to guess a secret [13].
Other measures exist, modeling different security properties (e. g. [16]). Our contributions
are:
We characterize program-attacker scenarios according to the finiteness of the system’s
secret and the finiteness of the attacker’s observation. We show how this characterization
influences the finiteness of the information leakage in the scenario.
We provide a method to compute information leakage of a scenario with either an infinite
secret or an infinite observation. Such scenarios cannot even be modeled with a finite
size channel matrix. We demonstrate this method with an example.
We provide a method to compute the rate of information leakage per time unit, when
the leakage itself is infinite. This is the case when a scenario has an infinite secret and
an infinite observation, as is common e. g. in webservices. We demonstrate this method
using a mix node as an example.
We provide an algorithm to compute how much information is leaked from a given time
to another given time.
We show that determining the exact time in which a given amount of information is
leaked is hard, by reduction to the knowingly hard to decide Skolem’s problem.
We distinguish four possible scenarios, according to whether the observation by the
attacker is finite or infinite and whether the secret itself is finite or infinite. The cases are
summarized in Fig. 1. The case with finite observation over a program depending on a finite
secret is the terminating case we considered previously [4], while the others will be considered
in this paper. When only one of observation or secret is finite the leakage is finite but cannot
be computed using the method we introduced previously [4], thus we provide a new technique
in Section 3. When both observation and secret are infinite, the leakage is potentially infinite.
In this case we compute the rate of leakage, i. e. the amount of information leaked for each
time unit. Intuitively, this quantifies the average amount of information the attacker infers
for each time unit over an infinite time. This is presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we
analyze how much information is leaked in a given time frame and how much time it takes
to leak a given amount of information. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses related
work.
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2 Background
We refer to literature [8] for the definitions of sample space S, probability of event P (E)
and so on. X is a discrete stochastic process if it is an indexed infinite sequence of discrete
random variables (X0, X1, X2, . . .). A discrete stochastic process is a Markov chain C =
(C0, C1, C2, . . .) iff ∀k ∈ N. P (Ck|Ck−1, Ck−2, . . . , C1, C0) = P (Ck|Ck−1). A Markov chain
on a sample space S can also be defined as follows:
I Definition 1. A tuple C = (S, s0, P ) is a Markov Chain (MC), if S is a finite set of
states, s0∈S is the initial state and P is a single |S| × |S| probability transition matrix, so
∀s, t∈S. Ps,t≥0 and ∀s∈S.
∑
t∈S Ps,t = 1.
The probability of transitioning from any state s to a state t in k steps can be found as
the entry of index (s, t) in P k [8]. We write pi(k) for the probability distribution vector over
S at time k and pi(k)s the probability of visiting the state s at time k; note that pi(k) = pi0P k,
where pi(0)s is 1 if s = s0 and 0 otherwise. A probability distribution p¯i over the states of
the chain is stationary if p¯i = p¯iP . Given an initial distribution pi(0) we compute the unique
stationary limit distribution µ as µ = limk→∞ pi(0)P k.
We write ξs for the expected residence time of state s ∈ S: ξs =
∑∞
k=0 P
k
s0,s. A state
s ∈ S is absorbing if Ps,s = 1. In the figures we do not draw the looping transition of the
absorbing states, to reduce clutter.
We will enrich our Markovian models with a finite set V of natural-valued variables, and
for simplicity we assume that there is a very large finite bit-size M such that a variable is
at most M bit long. We define an assignment function A : S → [0, 2M − 1]|V| assigning to
each state the values of the variables in that state. We write v(s) to denote the value of the
variable v ∈ V in the state s ∈ S. Consider a stochastic process representing the value of
a variable v over time, derived fro the behavior of a Markov chain labeled with valuations
of this variable. We will call this process the marginal process, or just marginal, C|v on v,
formally:
I Definition 2. Let C = (S, s0, P ) be a Markov chain and v ∈ V a variable. Then we define
the marginal process C|v of C on v as a stochastic process (v1, v2, . . .) where ∀n. P (vk = n) =∑
{s|v(s)=n} pi
(k)
s
We will use v to denote the marginal process when it is clear from the context that we
refer to it. Note that C|v is not necessarily a Markov chain. When it is, it can be drawn
like in Fig. 3bcd. In the paper we will allow assignments of sets of values to variables and
marginals on sets of variables; such extensions are straightforward, since multiple variables
can be seen as a single variable on their product space. Assume that the system modeled by
C has a single secret variable h and a single observable variable o. Then the distributions over
the marginal processes C|h and C|o model the behavior of the secret and observable variable
respectively at each time step, and their correlation quantifies the amount of information
about the secret that can be inferred by observing the observable variable.
Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of a probability distribution. The following
definitions are standard:
I Definition 3 ([8]). Let X and Y be two random variables with probability mass functions
p(x) and p(y) respectively and joint probability mass function p(x, y). Then we define the
following non-negative real-valued functions:
Entropy H(X) = −∑x∈X p(x) log2 p(x)
Joint entropy H(X,Y ) = −∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log2 p(x, y)
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Conditional entropy H(X|Y ) = −∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log2 p(x|y) =
=
∑
y∈Y p(y)H(X|Y = y) = −
∑
y∈Y p(y)
∑
x∈X p(x|y) log2 p(x|y) =
= H(X,Y )−H(Y ) (chain rule)
Mutual information I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y p(x, y) log2
(
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
)
=
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) ≤ min(H(X), H(Y ))
Mutual information can be generalized to two vectors of random variables X¯, Y¯ as I(X¯; Y¯ ) =∑
x¯∈X¯
∑
y¯∈Y¯ p(x¯, y¯) log2
(
p(x¯,y¯)
p(x¯)p(y¯)
)
.
I Definition 4. [8] Let X = (X1, X2, . . .) and Y = (Y1, Y2, . . .) be two stochastic processes.
Then we define the following non-negative real-valued functions:
Entropy H(X ) = limk→∞H(X1, X2, . . . , Xk)
Entropy rate H¯(X ) = limk→∞ 1kH(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) when the limit exists
Mutual information I(X ;Y) = limk→∞ I(X1, X2, . . . , Xk;Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk)
Mutual information rate I¯(X ;Y) = limk→∞ 1k I(X1, X2, . . . , Xk;Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk) when the
limit exists
Entropy and mutual information of stochastic processes always exist, as shown in Section
3. Entropy rate and mutual information rate may not exist in general, but exist when the
stochastic processes are Markov chains [8]; we discuss them in Section 4.
Since every state s in a MC C = (S, s0, P ) has a discrete probability distribution over the
successor states we can calculate the entropy of this distribution, the local entropy:
I Definition 5. Let C = (S, s0, P ) be a Markov chain. Then for each state s ∈ S we define
the local entropy of s as L(s) = −∑t∈S Ps,t log2 Ps,t
Note that L(s) ≤ log2(|S|) [5]. If a stochastic process is a Markov chain C, its entropy H(C)
can be computed by considering the local entropy L(s) as the expected reward of a state
s and then computing the expected total reward of the chain [5]: H(C) = ∑s∈S L(s)ξs.
It is also known that the entropy rate can be computed similarly by summing the local
entropies of each state weighted by the state’s probability in the limiting distribution [8]:
H¯(C) = ∑s∈S L(s)µs.
In this paper we use information theory to compute the amount of bits of a secret variable
h that can be inferred by an attacker able to observe the value of an observable variable
o at any moment in time. We call this amount Shannon leakage or just leakage, and it
corresponds to the mutual information I(C|o, C|h) between the marginal on the secret and
the marginal on the observable variable.
Operationally, Shannon leakage is related to the number of attempts that an attacker has
to do to guess the value of the secret. Other leakage measures exist, but Shannon leakage is
the only one for which the chain rule of Definition 3 holds; since the chain rule is used in
many results in this work, we do not expect such results to extend to other leakage measures.
The modeling of a process as a Markov chain in our context starts by dividing the
variables in private and public variables. Private variables, including the secret variable h,
are the ones whose value is not defined at compilation time. In each state of the Markov
chain a set of allowed values is assigned to each private variable. Public variables, including
the observable variable o and the program counter pc, are variables whose value is known to
the analyst. On each state a given value is assigned to each public variable.
Given the source code and a prior distribution over the private variables, we have enough
information to build a Markov chain representing the semantics, since for each state we can
determine its successor states and the corresponding transition probabilities. We show a
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1 secret int1 h;
2 observable int1 o;
3 public int1 r;
4 random r := randombit (0.75);
5 assign o := h ^ r;
6 return;
Figure 2 Bit XOR example: source code.
Figure 3 Bit XOR example: a) Markov chain semantics C. b) Joint marginal C|(o,h). c) Secret’s
marginal C|h. d) Observer’s marginal C|o.
simple example, and refer to [4] for the complete semantics. The source code for the example
is shown in Fig. 2 and the corresponding Markov chain semantics in Fig. 3a.
Let h be a secret bit, o an observable bit and r a random bit being assigned the value 0
with probability 0.75 and 1 otherwise. We assign to o the result of the exclusive OR between
h and r and terminate. We want to quantify the amount of information about h that can be
inferred by knowing the value of o.
To compute the leakage we need to compute three marginals from the Markov chain
semantics:
Joint marginal The joint marginal process C|(o,h) models the joint behavior of the secret
and observable variables. It is shown in Fig. 3b.
Secret’s marginal The secret’s marginal process C|h models the behavior of the secret
variable. It is shown in Fig. 3c.
Observer’s marginal The observer’s marginal process C|o models the behavior of the observ-
able variable. It is shown in Fig. 3d.
Finally we compute the mutual information between the secret and observable variable
using the formula I(X;Y ) = H(X) + H(Y ) − H(X,Y ), obtaining I(o; h) = I(C|o; C|h) =
H(C|o) +H(C|h))−H(C|(o,h))) = 1 + 1− 1.8112 . . . ≈ 0.1887 bits, proving that the program
leaks ≈ 0.1887 bits, or 18.87% of the secret.
3 Non-terminating Processes with Finite Leakage
The Markov chain semantics of the system describes the joint behavior of all variables. To
compute information leakage we are only interested in the secret and the observable variables,
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so we can restrict to them only for simplicity. We assume that the system has a single
secret variable h with uniform prior distribution and a single observable variable o, but the
procedure does not change for multiple secret or observable variables. We remark that, even
though the attacker can perform multiple observations, we do not model the case in which
the attacker actually interacts with the system. In such case directed information would
have to be used as the leakage metric instead of mutual information. We refer to Alvim et
al. [2] for the details.
The behavior of the secret variable h is modeled by the marginal C|h, and similarly the
behavior of o is modeled by C|o and the joint behavior of the two variables by C|o,h. The
following lemma shows the existence of the entropy values of such marginals and a sufficient
condition for the finiteness of their mutual information:
I Theorem 6. Let C = (S, s0, P ) be a Markov chain with secrets and observations and C|o
and C|h its marginals on the observable and secret variables, respectively. Then:
H(C|o), H(C|h) and I(C|o; C|h) exist;
H(C|o) <∞∨H(C|h) <∞⇒ I(C|o, C|h) <∞
Intuitively, if H(C|o) < ∞ and H(C|h) = ∞ then there is an infinite number of secret
bits but only a finite amount of observations we can analyze. In the opposite case where
H(C|o) =∞ and H(C|h) <∞ we can analyze an infinite number of observations, but there is
only a finite amount of secret bits to be discovered.
If eitherH(C|o)=∞ orH(C|h)=∞ thenH(C|o,h)=∞, sinceH(X,Y )≥max(H(X), H(Y )).
It follows that if either the observation or the secret are infinite but not both, the formula
I(C|o, C|h) = H(C|o) +H(C|h)−H(C|o,h) will produce an indeterminate form ∞−∞ and thus
cannot be directly used to compute the leakage. Nonetheless, in both cases leakage has a
finite value by Theorem 6.
If any marginal is a Markov chain, it is possible to compute its entropy in polynomial
time in the size of the chain [5]. Otherwise, consider that the entropies of the marginals
are limit computations, since H(C|v) = limk→∞H(v1, . . . , vk). This allows us to compute
mutual information using the limit of the entropies of the marginal processes:
I(C|o; C|h) = lim
k→∞
I(o1, . . . , ok; h1, . . . , hk)
= lim
k→∞
(H(o1, . . . , ok) +H(h1, . . . , hk)−H((o, h)1, . . . , (o, h)k))
The limit above computes information leakage in any case, but is not always the most
efficient option available. When it is known that the secret (resp. observation) is finite,
it is more efficient to use the formula I(C|o; C|h) = H(C|h) −H(C|h|C|o) (resp. I(C|o; C|h) =
H(C|o)−H(C|o|C|h)). Remember that when both secret and observation are finite the process
terminates, so the procedure we proposed in [4] can be used with some additional assumptions.
3.1 Example: A Non-terminating Program on a Finite Secret
We now solve a case in which the secret is finite and Markovian and the observation infinite.
Consider a program (Figure 4) with a secret bit h. If h is 0 the program produces an infinite
string of zeroes and ones with the same probability 0.5, starting with a zero. If h is 1 the
program also produces a string of zeroes and ones starting with a zero, but the probability
that it will produce a zero is 0.75. Note that this program cannot be encoded as a finite
channel matrix, as it has an infinite amount of possible outputs.
An attacker may be able to observe this infinite string and infer information about
the secret by studying the frequencies of zeroes and ones. The attacker starts with no
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1 secret int1 h;
2 if (h==0) then
3 observable int1 o:=0;
4 while (0==0) do
5 random o:= randombit
(0.5);
6 od
7 else
8 observable int1 o:=0;
9 while (0==0) do
10 random o:= randombit
(0.75);
11 od
12 fi
13 return;
b)a)
Figure 4 Non-terminating leaking program example. On the left: program code. On the right:
Markov chain semantics a) joint marginal C|o,h b) secret’s marginal C|h.
knowledge of the secret, which is encoded as an initial uniform distribution over the secret
bit h. Reasonably, an attacker observing the output for an infinite time would be able to
decide whether the frequency of zeroes is 0.5 or 0.75 and infer the value of h consequently.
The Markov chain semantics for it is shown in Fig. 4a on the right.
Since h1 = h2 = h3 = . . . we will just call it h. The behavior of h is modeled by the
Markov chain in Fig. 4b on the right, and its entropy is H(h) = 1 bit. H(C|h|C|o) corresponds
to limk→∞H(h|o1, . . . , ok).
We compute H(h|o1, . . . , ok) for k → ∞. Note that at time 1 o is always 0, then it
changes randomly depending on the value of h. We will write down the joint distribution
of h and o as a function of k and use it to compute the marginal over o and finally the
conditional entropy.
The joint distribution of h and o is shown in the Appendix due to space constraints. Now
let wk ∈ {0, 1}k be a sequence of k bits. Consider the formula for conditional entropy:
H(h|o1, . . . , ok) =
∑
wk∈{0,1}k
P (o1, . . . , ok = wk)H(h|o1, . . . , ok = wk) (1)
In our case it holds that H(h|o) = limk→∞H(h|o1, . . . , ok) = 0 thus I(o; h) = H(h) −
H(h|o) = 1 − 0 = 1 bit. The leakage of the program in Fig. 4 is 1 bit, proving that an
attacker able to analyze the bit streams produced by the system will eventually learn the
value of the secret h with an arbitrary confidence. Note that this considers an attacker able
to observe the system for an infinite time.
More importantly, note that the marginal process of o is not a Markov chain. This
depends on the fact that the joint distribution depends also on the information that the
attacker has about h, so while the attacker gathers information about o and h the joint
distribution changes and thus the marginal distribution of o changes also. Nonetheless, the
marginal process can be represented in a closed form like the one in Fig. 4.
4 Leakage Rate of a Markov Chain
In the case in which H(C|o) =∞ and H(C|h) =∞, i. e. when the secret is an infinite number
of bits and the observer can observe it for an infinite time, then the leakage I(o, h) can be
infinite. In this case it is more interesting to compute how much information the process
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Data: A Markov Chain C = (S, s0, P ) and its initial probability distribution pi(0).
Result: The limit probability distribution µ of the chain.
1 foreach transient state t do
2 µt ← 0;
3 foreach u ∈ S \ {t} do
4 pi
(0)
u ← pi(0)u + pi(0)t Pt,u1−Pt,t
5 foreach s ∈ S \ {t} do
6 Ps,u ← Ps,u + Ps,t Pt,u1−Pt,t
7 Ps,t ← 0
8 end
9 end
10 end
11 foreach end component Ri do
12 Let pi(∞)Ri =
∑
r∈Ri pi
(0)
s and Ei be a system of linear equations;
13 foreach r ∈ Ri do Add to Ei the equation µr =
∑
r′∈Ri µr′Pr′,r ;
14 Solve the system E’ under the condition
∑
r∈Ri µr = pi
(∞)
Ri
to obtain µr for each
r ∈ Ri;
15 end
Algorithm 1. Compute the limit distribution of a Markov chain.
leaks for each time step. This quantity is known as leakage rate, and corresponds to the
mutual information rate of the secret and observable.
Note that the computation of leakage as a rate over time assumes that the attacker is able
to keep track of the discrete time, so in this section we will assume that every constant-time
operation takes 1 time step. This can be equivalently stated as saying that all transitions
between states of the Markov chain semantics represent observable steps.
To compute leakage rate, we encode the process-attacker scenario with a Markov chain
as shown in Section 2 and compute the joint, secret and attacker’s marginal, which may
not be Markovian. Then we can use the marginals to compute leakage rate by applying the
following definition:
I Definition 7. Let C = (S, s0, P ) be a Markov chain and C|o,h, C|o and Ch its marginals
on (o,h), o and h respectively. Then the leakage rate I¯ is defined as I¯(C|o; Ch) = H¯(C|o) +
H¯(C|h)− H¯(C|o,h).
Leakage rate can also be computed as a limit, since
I¯(C|o; C|h) = lim
k→∞
I(o1, . . . , ok; h1, . . . , hk)
k
= lim
k→∞
(H(o1, . . . , ok) +H(h1, . . . , hk)−H((o, h)1, . . . , (o, h)k))
k
when the limit exists.
Generally both entropy and leakage rate could be infinite, for instance for a program that
leaks 1 bit at time 1, 2 bits at time 2, and so on, the leakage rate would be infinite. Since we
postulated that there exists a very large but finite maximum size M for the variables declared
in the system, it is impossible to declare an unbounded amount of secret or observable bits on
each step of the program execution. We do not think that this restriction limits significantly
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the programs that can be analyzed, while guaranteeing that the entropy and leakage rate do
not diverge to positive infinity is a significantly useful result.
Both entropy rate and leakage rate may still oscillate, even though since they are defined
in terms of Cesàro limits this happens only in pathological cases. We do not expect these
cases to be common in normal secret-dependent systems, and leave finding a meaningful
measure of leakage for these cases an open problem. This reflects similar issues in related
definitions of leakage rate [7, 12].
A case in which both entropy and leakage rate exist is when the marginal processes
modeling the behavior of the observable and secret variables are both Markovian. Intuitively,
this happens when the secret gets periodically replaced with a new one, and thus the
information the attacker has on it is reset to the prior information. We will show this with
an example in Section 4.1.
When any of the marginals is a Markov chain it is possible to compute its entropy rate
efficiently as H¯(C) = ∑s∈S L(s)µs, where µ is the limit distribution of the chain. The
entropy rate of a Markov chain with a given initial probability distribution pi(0) exists and is
unique [8].
Computing the limit distribution can be accomplished on irreducible Markov chains by
solving a system of linear equations, but the Markov chains we consider are usually reducible,
so a new algorithm is required. Algorithm 1 computes the limit distribution of any Markov
Chain C = (S, s0, P ). The algorithm uses the well-established concept of end components of
a MC; each end component Ri behaves as an irreducible MC, so it is sufficient to compute
the probability pi(∞)Ri of eventually visiting Ri and redistribute pi
(∞)
Ri
among the states of Ri
by solving a system of linear equations.
I Theorem 8. Algorithm 1 terminates in polynomial time in |S| and when it does it returns
the limit distribution µ.
Due to space constraints we refer to the Appendix for the proof of this theorem and a
full explanation of the steps of Algorithm 1.
Since computing the local entropy of each state in time O(|S|2) is trivial, the formula
H¯(C) = ∑s∈S L(s)µs can be used to compute entropy rate of a Markov chain in polynomial
time. Note that this is a particular case of the computation of an expected infinite-horizon
reward rate of a reward function defined on the transitions of a Markov chain.
Having computed the entropy rates of the joint, secret and attacker’s marginals we can
apply Definition 7 to obtain the leakage rate of the system.
4.1 Example: Leaking Mix Node Implementation
We show an example of a program leaking an infinite amount of information and we compute
its leakage rate using the method described above.
A mix node [9] is a program meant to scramble the order in which packages are routed
through a network, to increase the anonymity of the sender. Even if the packages are
encrypted, some information about the sender could be inferred by observing the order in
which they are forwarded. A mix node changes this order to a random one, thus making it
harder for an attacker to connect each package to its sender.
A mix node waits until it has accumulated a fixed amount of packages, and then forwards
them in a random order. If the exit order of the packages is independent from the entrance
order, then no information about the latter can be inferred by observing the former. We
will present an implementation of a mix node where the entrance and exit order are not
independent and compute the rate of the information leakage.
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1 secret int3 inorder;
2 public int3 rand;
3 observable int3 outorder;
4 while (0==0) do
5 assign inorder := [0,5];
6 random rand := random (0,5);
7 assign outorder :=
8 (inorder ^ rand)%6;
9 od
10 return;
Figure 5 A leaking implementation of a mix node.
The implementation of the mix node is shown in Fig. 5. This particular node waits until
it has accumulated 3 packages and then sends them in a random order. Naming the packages
A, B and C there are 6 possible entrance orders: ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, and CBA.
We will number them from 0 to 5.
In line 5 of the code a random number from 0 to 5 is assigned to the secret variable
inorder, modeling the secret entrance order. Then in line 6 a random value uniformly
distributed from 0 to 5 is assigned to the variable rand. Finally, in line 7 the bitwise exclusive
OR modulo 6 of the variables inorder and rand is assigned to the observable variable
outorder, which represents the order in which the packages exit from the mix node and is
observable to the attacker. After producing an exit order the mix node receives three more
packages in a new entrance order, scrambles them the same way and forwards them, and so
on forever.
Assume that the prior distribution over the input order is uniform. The resulting
probability distribution on the exit order is P (outorder) = {0 7→ 5/18, 1 7→ 5/18, 2 7→
2/18, 3 7→ 2/18, 4 7→ 2/18, 5 7→ 2/18}. This depends on the fact that bitwise OR and modulo
operations do not preserve distribution uniformity.
The Markov chain semantics of the system has more than 300 states. It can be computed
and analyzed automatically in less than a second. Assuming that each line of code is
executed in one time step, the entropy rates of the marginals are H¯(inorder) = 0.86165 . . .
bits, H¯(outorder) = 0.82766 . . . and H¯(inorder, outorder) = 1.59367 . . ., giving a leakage
rate of I¯(inorder; outorder) = H¯(inorder) + H¯(outorder) − H¯(inorder, outorder) =
0.86165 . . .+ 0.82766 . . .− 1.59367 . . . ≈ 0.09564 bits.
The leakage rate for each time unit is ≈ 0.09564 bits. Since the entropy rate of the secret
is ≈ 0.86165 bits, we can conclude that this implementation of a mix node has a rate of
leakage 0.09564/0.86165 ≈ 11.1% of each of its infinite secrets.
Note that in this simple case the loop always takes 3 time units to complete, so it would
have been possible to just compute the leakage of one loop and divide it by 3, but in general
loops do not compute for a fixed number of time units, e. g. if they contain multiple return
statements.
5 Bounded Time/Leakage Analysis
We consider two similar bounded approaches to the leakage problem: computing the leakage
of a Markov chain within a given time frame, or computing how long it takes for the Markov
chain to leak a given amount of information.
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Data: A Markov Chain C = (S, s0, P ) with the variables o and h, two integers t1 and
t2 satisfying t1 ≤ t2.
Result: The leakage from time t1 to time t2 I(t1,t2)(o, h)
1 for x ∈ {o, h, (o, h)} do
2 Compute the marginal C|x, and let pi(t1)|x be the probability distribution over its
states at time t1 and H(t1)(C|x) = H(pi(t1)|x );
3 end
4 Compute I(t1,t1) = H(t1)(C|o) +H(t1)(C|h)−H(t1)(C|o,h);
5 for i = t1 + 1 to t2 do
6 for x ∈ {o, h, (o, h)} do
7 H(i)(C|x)← H(i−1)(C|x) +
∑
s∈S|x pi
(i−1)
|x (s)L|x(s);
8 pi
(i)
|x ← pi(i−1)|x P (i−1,i)|x ;
9 end
10 I(t1,i) ← H(i)(C|o) +H(i)(C|h)−H(i)(C|o,h);
11 end
12 return I(t1,t2);
Algorithm 2. Compute the leakage of a MC from a time t1 to a time t2.
5.1 Bounded Time
We want to compute the leakage for an attacker that is able to observe the behavior of the
program for t <∞ time units. We abstract time by considering each time unit as a step in
the evolution of the Markov chain modeling the system. The definition of mutual information
from a time t1 to a time t2 > t1 is as follows:
I Definition 9. Let X and Y be two stochastic processes. Then the mutual information
between Xi and Yi from time t1 to time t2 is I(Xt1 , . . . , Xt2 ;Yt1 , . . . , Yt2) = H(Xt1 , . . . , Xt2)+
H(Yt1 , . . . , Yt2)−H(Xt1 , . . . , Xt2 , Yt1 , . . . , Yt2)
We will refer to it as I(t1,t2)(X ;Y) for simplicity.
Consider as usual the Markov chain semantics C = (S, so, P ) modeling the behavior of
the system. We present an iterative algorithm to compute I(t1,t2)(o, h) in time O(t2|S|2):
the algorithm first computes the distribution at time t1 and then computes the behavior of
the chain until time t2 while keeping track of the amount of leakage accumulated. In the
algorithm let S|x be the state space of the marginal, pi(i)|x the distribution on the marginal at
time i, and P (i,j)|x the probability of transitioning from i to j in the marginal.
I Theorem 10. Algorithm 2 terminates in time O(t2|S|2) and when it does it outputs
I(t1,t2)(o, h).
Note that Algorithm 2 is pseudopolynomial, as it depends not only on the size of the
chain but also on the parameter t2. Also note that due to the Markov property it holds that
I(t1,t2) = I(t′1,t′2) whenever pi(t1)|o,h = pi
(t′1)
|o,h and t2 − t1 = t′2 − t′1.
5.2 Bounded Leakage
We want to determine how many time units it takes for the system to leak a given amount c
of bits of information. The problem is more complex than the one analyzed in the previous
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section, since leakage is a complex function of the behavior of the system in time and finding
a way to bound or reverse it is not obvious.
We start by considering the qualitative version of the problem: does there exist a time t
such that It(CO, Ch) ≥ c? To answer we note that the the sequence of leakages is monotonic
non-decreasing over time, so if the answer is yes then the leakage will remain greater than
c for each time t′ ≥ t. This allows us to answer the qualitative question by computing the
leakage on the infinite time horizon as shown in Section 3; let it be l∞. If l∞ < c then there
is no time t such that the leakage is c, while if l∞ > c then such time exists. If l∞ = c
then the system leaks c bits on the infinite time horizon but we have no guarantee that this
amount will be reached in finite time.
In the case in which l∞ ≥ c we can ask the quantitative question, i. e. at what time
t the system will have leaked at least c bits. If l∞ > c we know that such time t exists,
while if l∞ = c it may not. We will define the bounded leakage problem as follows: given a
Markov chain C = (S, s0, P ) labeled with secrets and observations and a positive real number
c, determine if there exists a finite time t such that the information leakage of the chain at
time t is exactly c.
The problem is harder than it seems. For deterministic programs, it has been shown
by Terauchi that it is not a k-safety property for any k [17]. The problem has also been
addressed computationally by Heusser and Malacaria [10]. For randomized programs, we will
show that the problem can be reduced from Skolem’s problem [14]. While smaller instances
have been shown to be decidable, the full decidability of Skolem’s problem is still an open
question [15]. Akshay et al. [1] show that Skolem’s problem is equivalent to the following:
given a Markov chain C = (S, s0, P ), a state s and a probability r determine whether there
is a time t such that pi(t)s = r. We will call this Skolem’s Markov chain reachability problem.
Intuitively, information leakage is a harder problem than reachability, as formally stated by
the following theorem:
I Theorem 11. Let A be an algorithm deciding the bounded leakage problem. Then A decides
Skolem’s Markov chain reachability problem.
6 Conclusions and Related Work
We have shown how to provide meaningful measures of the effectiveness of a secret-dependent
non-terminating program in protecting its secret, by computing Shannon leakage when its
value is finite and Shannon leakage rate otherwise. Operationally, Shannon leakage is related
to the expected number of guesses it will take for the attacker to find out the secret’s value,
so leakage and leakage rate can be used to understand the amount of time that the attacker
will require to infer the system’s secret [13]. To the same aim, we provided an algorithm
that computes the amount of leakage from a program in a given time frame. Finally, we
have shown that a precise quantification of the time required to leak a given amount is a
hard problem, proving the complexity of the problem.
The quantification of leakage for an infinite observation and a finite or infinite secret has
been recently considered by Chothia et al. [7]. Their framework is different from ours as they
study probabilistic “point to point” leakage; also they provide no algorithms to compute
leakage. The authors do not consider the case in which the observation is finite and the
secret infinite. Also, in the infinite secret and observation case they explicitly do not consider
the leakage rate per time unit, preferring to compute the leakage for each occurrence of the
secret command in their framework.
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Alvim et al. [2] study the setting of interactive systems, where secrets and observables
can alternate during the computation and influence each other. They show that in this
case mutual information is only an upper bound on leakage and “direct information” is a
more precise leakage measure. This work is related to ours in that it investigates multi-stage
processes but it presents significant differences as it doesn’t investigate infinite leakage nor
Markovian processes.
Recently Backes et al. also present a method for leakage rate computation based on
stationary distribution of Markov chains, which they compute using PageRank [3]. We expect
that Algorithm 1 would be a useful addition to their approach.
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